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Industrial policy – in the definition we adopt here - consists of sector- and industry-
specific policies that aim to direct industrialization in line with some definition of the 
national interest. Whatever the broader national goals of development are, achieving 
them is more likely if industrialization achieves rapid productivity growth by 
absorbing and learning to use the best possible technologies. Indeed, sustaining 
productivity growth in line with international competitors is a fundamental condition 
for the sustainability of any industrialization strategy. In this chapter, we focus on 
some very specific problems of achieving and sustaining productivity growth in late 
developers as one of the conditions for a successful industrial policy. We draw a 
fundamental distinction between sustaining productivity growth in sectors that are 
already market competitive, where the role of industrial policy is limited to regulating 
the market to ensure sustained compulsions for productivity growth, or maintaining 
what the World Bank refers to as the ‘investment climate,’ and achieving rapid 
productivity growth in sectors or firms that are catching up to become market 
competitive in the future, for which policies target specific firms or sectors.  We argue 
that for late developers, rapid catching up with more advanced countries is the key. 
Merely sustaining market competition in the former role of industrial policy creates 
poor second-best conditions for ensuring rapid productivity growth, as the latter’s 
policies, which accelerate the absorption and learning of advanced technologies, can 
deliver much more rapid development possibilities. To engage in this debate, we will 
refer to the non-targeted, investment climate type of industrial policy as ‘weak’ or 
‘horizontal’ industrial policy and the type of industrial policy that aims to accelerate 
technology acquisition and productivity growth in particular areas as ‘strong’ or 
‘targeted’ industrial policy. 
 
The case for horizontal or weak industrial policy is that if the state can create general 
conditions for investments to be secure and profits to be high, this will attract the most 
profitable technologies to the developing country. However, with current 
technological capacities, only low technology and low value-added activities are 
profitable. Building up technological capacity can yield very high returns in the future 
but because the ‘risk’ of failure is uninsurable, private investors are unlikely to play a 
big role in making investments in learning at early stages of development. Rapid 
catching up therefore requires strong industrial policy, described as some strategy of 
targeted technology acquisition that allows the follower country to catch up rapidly 
with leader countries. While technical progress is possible along the trajectory set by a 
 
1 The authors would like to thank Jonathan DiJohn for helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
Second Draft: August 2006.as+gd.2.19.08 
 2
market-driven strategy, the climb up the technology ladder is likely to be much slower 
than with an active technology acquisition and learning strategy.  
 
An obstacle for strong industrial policy is that while there is a credible theoretical case 
for intervention in late developers to assist them to move rapidly up the technology 
ladder, the institutional and political problems raised are quite different from those 
faced by earlier developers. If non-market incentives are required for catching up, the 
effective implementation of such strategies typically also requires institutional 
systems of compulsion to supplement the discipline imposed by the market. When 
states intervene in markets to assist technology acquisition, by definition, they create 
new incentives and opportunities, and the market on its own may well not suffice as a 
disciplining mechanism for the resources allocated by the state. The precise nature of 
the institutional compulsions required depends on the specific mechanisms through 
which the state attempts to accelerate technology acquisition and investment. The key 
point that we want to make is that the diversity of the Asian experience tells us the 
importance of the compatibility of the institutional compulsions that industrial policy 
strategies require to be successful with the organization and structure of political 
power in that society that may or may not allow the effective enforcement of the 
requisite strategy.  
 
It is not surprising that the institutions required for weak industrial policy should be 
substantially different from those required for strong industrial policy. Further, the 
institutions that are appropriate for strong industrial policy can differ substantially 
between countries depending on the technology acquisition strategy. In principle, we 
can imagine a number of different strategies that could create both opportunities and 
compulsions for rapid and effective technology acquisition and learning. But not all 
strategies are likely to work in every country, and in some countries, the 
implementation of any strategy is likely to require other preconditions.  
 
The strategy that is most likely to be effectively implemented and enforced in a 
country can depend amongst other things on its internal distribution of organizational 
power. If the enforcement of critical conditions required for a particular strategy fails, 
sticking with industrial policy may deliver worse outcomes than abandoning it, even 
though failed attempts at industrial policy may have useful unintended consequences 
for building up technological capacity that may later be effective in market-based 
weak industrial policy strategies. This can explain why a) many different strategies 
have apparently assisted industrial catching up in East Asia, and b) some countries 
like India have done better by apparently abandoning strong industrial policy regimes. 
There is some evidence of a similar experience in Latin America, with some countries 
achieving growth in new sectors that already enjoy international comparative 
advantage.  
 
This chapter primarily draws on the evidence from Asia, which provides a wide range 
of industrial sector policy experiences. Success stories such as South Korea and 
Taiwan are well known, but Asia also provides examples of moderately successful 
cases such as Malaysia, where foreign multinationals led industrial upgrading. Asia 
also provides the interesting example of India in recent years, where after a limited 
liberalization, high technology sectors that had already achieved the capacity to attain 
international comparative advantage played an important role in driving economic 
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growth, together with the low technology sectors in which we would expect a country 
like India to have comparative advantage. There are also cases of moderate growth in 
Asia, such as Bangladesh where the abandonment of the industrial policy that patently 
failed in the sixties and seventies has been associated with growth led by low-
technology sectors. The conventional interpretation of the Asian experiences by the 
World Bank and other international agencies has been to identify the successful 
industrial policy countries as cases of exceptional state capacity, not replicable 
elsewhere, and to treat the more moderate cases of growth as the norm, proving the 
efficacy of abandoning industrial policy and following comparative advantage. This 
interpretation has been a justification for economic reforms in the vast majority of 
developing countries that have not performed very well.  
 
Our argument is that this interpretation fails to identify the importance of industrial 
policy in achieving rapid development in the successful Asian countries in a number 
of important respects. First, although the role of the state in the successful developers 
is increasingly recognized, the role of industrial policy in the successful developers is 
underplayed. Secondly, the distinctive feature of successful East Asian developers 
was not that they had exceptional state capacities that are not achievable anywhere 
else. Rather, the distinctive feature of the success stories was that the particular 
variant of industrial policy that each tried was compatible with internal power 
balances that allowed the state to create incentives and compulsions in critical areas. 
Thirdly, the policy conclusion that less successful countries should come away with is 
not how to abandon vestiges of their failed industrial policies at the fastest possible 
rate, but to identify the type of industrial policy that is implementable in their 
particular context given critical internal and external political constraints. In many 
cases, the feasible industrial policy may yield less dramatic results than in the most 
spectacular of the Asian cases. In others, one must address some of the critical 
political constraints in order to allow implementation of even limited industrial 
policies. In both cases, the long-run results are likely to be better than if policy only 
attempted to create general market conditions for industrial growth using the good 
governance or good investment climate approaches.  
 
The subsequent argument makes the following points. In section 1, we look at the 
central argument that makes state assistance so critical in late developers trying to 
catch up. While there are many reasons why the state has to play a role in the 
acquisition or development of technology, we only look at the simplest and yet most 
powerful one to develop our case. This is the problem of organizing learning-by-
doing and the uninsurable risks that arise during this process. Section 2 discusses in 
similarly simple terms a number of different strategies of coordination and support 
that states in different Asian countries have used to promote catching-up. Section 3 
looks at our core issue of the compatibility of the institutions of catching up with the 
organization of political power and discusses a number of variants in different Asian 
countries and in Latin America that help to explain the very different experiences of a 
number of different Asian countries and the difference between them and Latin 
America. We argue that the coincidence of liberalization with a growth spurt in some 
Asian countries can be better explained by our alternative analysis that identifies some 
of the limits of the previous industrial policy regime in these countries. We also 
extend this analysis to Latin America and argue that the failure of import substituting 
industrialization across Latin America, and the consequent liberalization policy shock 
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led to a similar process of shifting to technologies that were already profitable given 
technical capacities as well as to wide-spread technological downgrading. 
 
1 Catching up and the state 
Catching up with advanced countries requires rapid and sustained productivity 
growth, which, this volume argues, depends on the creation of new technologies. 
Markets by themselves may have a role in better resource allocation, but are not 
sufficient to ensure that productivity growth will be rapid unless appropriate 
incentives and compulsions exist to induce the creation of new technologies or, in the 
case of developing countries, learning to use existing technologies effectively. It is 
possible to analyze these incentives and compulsions in terms of the existence and 
management of specific rents. The existence of rents for innovation or to allow 
learning creates the incentives for particular activities, but we also require institutions 
that can manage these rents to ensure that they do not last for too long, and that non-
performers do not succeed in retaining their rents. If these conditions hold, the 
appropriate rents and rent management systems can ensure productivity growth 
through technological progress or learning (Khan 2000a).  
 
In late developers, the role of non-market institutions has been critical in explaining 
success. As mentioned in Cimoli et al. (20008), this volume, the historical evidence 
suggests that a market economy is necessary but not sufficient for rapid catching up. 
If so, too much emphasis on developing the conditions for efficient markets can make 
us lose sight of the other institutional conditions critical for economic success. This is 
the problem with the focus on good governance and good investment climate 
conditions in developing countries, which focus primarily on creating conditions for 
investors exploiting existing comparative advantages. The puzzle for the market-
driven view of growth is that England was not the area of the world with the most 
developed markets. Why did rapid productivity growth associated with modern 
capitalism first take off in England and not in China, India, the Middle East, or other 
parts of Europe, which at different times were more advanced than England in terms 
of markets and technology? Marxist historians in the West have put forward two sorts 
of explanations, and the divide between them is still relevant for understanding 
contemporary debates on the determinants of and obstacles to the transition to high-
productivity economies in developing countries today.  
 
The first explanation argued that capitalism was essentially the freeing up of market 
opportunities, with production growth accepted as an extension of the market 
economy (Maurice Dobb, 1946; Paul Sweezy, 1950; and Douglass North, 1990). For 
instance, feudal obstacles to markets, such as barriers to labor, capital, and the free 
sale of land, were first overcome in the Western European transition to capitalism 
because internal and external factors weakened these feudal restrictions and allowed 
the market to grow. The modern neoclassical economics position, and indeed the US-
led international policy consensus championing the spread of democracy as a 
precondition of development have roots here. The policy conclusion that follows is 
that if political, cultural, and institutional obstacles to competitive markets can be 
removed, economic growth will accelerate. 
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In contrast to this position, the argument more closely associated with Marx’s own 
analysis points to the specific institutional conditions of early capitalism that ensured 
rapid productivity growth in England. The market had existed for thousands of years 
without leading to rapid productivity growth, so something much more special must 
have been involved in the relatively rapid growth associated with the development of 
English capitalism. Rapid productivity growth in England was associated with the 
emergence of a new system of property rights (a ‘mode of production’) that required 
the imposition of a new structure of rights and institutions that forced productivity 
growth in England in a way that did not happen elsewhere.  
 
If this view is correct, it has enormous significance for current debates on the 
institutional conditions for rapid productivity growth in developing countries. 
Dynamic economies are unlikely to emerge simply by removing obstacles to the 
market and trying to make markets more efficient. Rather, we have to ask what rights 
and institutions are necessary in the context of the contemporary world economy for 
rapid productivity growth, and we need to examine how these can be introduced. This 
perspective suggests that development involves a social transformation and opens up 
the possibility that far from market-enhancing strategies being sufficient, the state 
may have to play a leading role in organizing this social transformation. 
 
Classical Capitalism versus Late Development 
Even if we agree that the establishment of capitalism in the early developers required 
important non-market processes, it is not clear that the property rights and institutions 
that were appropriate for the early developers are appropriate for late developers. In 
early developers’ ‘classical capitalism’, the creation of a property-less class of 
workers and a class of asset owners competing amongst themselves to survive was 
sufficient to ensure relatively rapid productivity growth. A similar structure of rights 
in contemporary developing countries may not have the same effect, as developing 
countries must catch up to advanced countries with significantly higher productivity. 
A catching-up country under free trade would likely be stuck with low-technology 
production. Though developing countries have much lower wages, they also have 
much lower productivity in producing high technology products, due to the absence of 
appropriate labor and management skills that their schools and universities cannot 
teach. These skills must be learned on the job, a process described by economists as 
learning-by-doing2. This problem can condemn countries to very slow progress up the 
technology ladder.  
 
The importance of learning is progressively less the lower the sophistication of the 
technology involved in production, and the wage advantage of the developing country 
is more likely to kick in for low productivity technologies where the unit cost of 
production in developing countries is likely to be lower than with potentially high 
productivity technologies. As a result, the developing country appears to have a 
‘comparative advantage’ in producing low technology products. The developmental 
state literature (White 1988 and many others; Aoki, et al. 1997; Woo-Cumings 1999) 
and case studies of countries such as South Korea (Amsden 1989) and Taiwan (Wade 
1990) show that in this context, successful catching up has required a range of 
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institutions and interventions that are quite different from classical capitalism. The 
challenge for late capitalism is to address the problem that competitiveness and 
productivity are both a function of the technology embodied in capital equipment as 
well as social institutions that impose incentives and compulsions for achieving rapid 
learning. If these institutions and the associated social compulsions are missing, 
productivity could be low even with high-technology machinery, and low wages by 
themselves will not attract investment. However, as we shall see, these incentives and 
compulsions can vary significantly across countries, even if we look at the limited 
number of successful Asian developers of the last fifty years (Khan 2000a). 
 
These considerations mean that the social transformation in late developers is likely to 
be quite different from that of the early developers. Not only would late developers 
have to organize a different type of primitive accumulation, to take account of the fact 
that the scale and capital-intensity of high productivity production was now much 
greater, they would also have to organize catching-up strategies to acquire high-
productivity technologies that would eventually allow them to compete with advanced 
countries in high-wage industries. We will see that this imposes new challenges to the 
state during the social transformation required in late developers.  
2 Strategies of Catching Up  
The conventional explanations of why some countries have been more successful in 
sustaining high technology investments have focused on infrastructure and education, 
but, though important, these aspects of industrial policy do not take us far enough. 
Investment in infrastructure must simply keep pace with growth: countries such as 
Taiwan and South Korea in the sixties or China today faced persistent shortages of 
infrastructure but managed to keep investing at the appropriate pace. So, while 
infrastructure in general is important, pre-existing levels of infrastructure cannot fully 
explain why some countries have been much faster in moving up the technology 
ladder. Similarly, while education and skills can be a constraint in the long run, most 
developing countries in Asia have a surplus of skilled labor, and many even suffer 
from the emigration of skilled workers, suggesting that the failure to attract new 
investment in these countries cannot be explained by shortages in skilled labor. 
 
Infrastructural and educational explanations miss a key factor that determines whether 
high value-added industries will be successful. That is, learning to use high 
technology machines, and setting up the internal and external systems that are 
required to maximize productivity, takes time. This means that unless there is some 
institutional system that can create both the incentives and the compulsions for rapid 
learning to take place, investment in high productivity sectors is likely to fail. Since 
private investors know this, they are unlikely to invest in high-technology industries 
in a country that lacks the institutions that can induce and compel rapid learning.  
 
The basic problem can be shown using the very simple diagram shown in Figure 1. It 
shows that domestic productivity in the developing country is initially so low, that if it 
imports the potentially high-productivity foreign technology, it can initially have 
higher domestic marginal costs (DCE) than the international price PP' set by marginal 
costs in the advanced country. But this is only because productivity is low because of 
the absence of learning, not because it is permanently going to be low. Given the 
Second Draft: August 2006.as+gd.2.19.08 
 7
lower wages in the developing country, if the advanced technology was used at even a 
fraction of the productivity achieved in advanced countries, domestic marginal cost 
could fall to ABQ, allowing the developing country to compete in international 
markets. How does the developing country overcome this hurdle? The simplest way 
to acquire the learning is the classical infant industry strategy of providing a 
conditional subsidy or “learning rent” for a fixed period, with the condition that the 
subsidy will be withdrawn at the end of the period, or even earlier if performance is 
poor. In our diagram, a subsidy of ABCD to the domestic industry allows it to 
produce OQ1 of output.  
 
This subsidy need not be a direct financial transfer but could be a combination of 
hidden benefits that allows the new industry to start “learning-by-doing”. If learning 
can be successfully induced, marginal cost can be reduced to the advanced country 
level or even below, given the wage advantage of the developing country. But in the 
short run, these strategies have a cost, because they allow static inefficiency by 
allowing a loss-making industry to survive. The short run cost will only be 
worthwhile if the subsidy or benefits provided to allow learning actually succeed in 
generating long-term productivity growth and the country can enjoy higher living 
standards as a result. In fact, most developing countries that attempted these strategies 
in the past failed to achieve this productivity growth, and their infant industry 
strategies ultimately failed. But a few did succeed, and these countries graduated to 
become the newly industrializing countries especially of East Asia.  
 
 
Marginal Cost with
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Figure 1 Conditional Subsidies and Rents for Learning    Source: (Khan 2000a: Figure 1.8) 
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The widespread failure of developing countries to catch up with advanced countries is 
at least partly attributable to the failure of their institutions to compel productivity 
growth in learning industries, which requires institutions that can manage provided 
rents and provide credible compulsions and conditions for rapid learning. Thus, the 
institutions for inducing learning must both provide the incentives for learning and 
have the credibility to impose costs and sanctions on industries and firms that fail to 
achieve the required rate of learning. If the state does not have the credibility to 
withdraw a subsidy when there is underperformance, there will be a short-run cost as 
well as a permanent cost, because infant industries will never grow up. These 
conditions are particularly demanding because the optimal period of rent allocation 
for learning will vary from sector to sector, and across countries depending on the 
initial capacities of capitalists, managers, and worker.  
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Figure 2 Rent-Management with Learning Rents      Source: based on (Khan 2000a: Figure 1.7) 
 
Figure 2 shows that a conceptually optimal period of rent allocation exists for any 
particular sector and country, but for state institutions to discover this through trial 
and error requires fairly demanding conditions. Critical conditions for success include 
a capacity of the state to pragmatically monitor and make judgments about 
performance, and the capacity to re-allocate the subsidies and assets of non-
performers. Inevitably, mistakes are likely to be made, even in the most dynamic 
countries, but fortunately, all that we require is that state institutions can learn from 
their mistakes and rapidly correct them. But this in turn requires critical political 
capacities; in particular, the organization of power in society must be compatible with 
the rent-management that state institutions are trying to implement. Otherwise, rent 
re-allocations are likely to be blocked by groups or factions that would lose out from 
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such re-allocations, and if this happens frequently enough, the optimal rent allocation 
targets are not going to be discovered by any form of trial and error. 
 
However, direct subsidies to infant industries have not always been the route through 
which late developers have climbed up the technology ladder. Asian countries have 
used a number of other mechanisms to direct rents to high technology industries to 
ensure rapid progress up the technology ladder, and in each case, success has required 
appropriate institutions to manage these rents, and a corresponding political 
settlement that allowed this management to be implemented. For example, in the 
Taiwanese case, state involvement in technology included licensing from abroad, with 
the state paying for some of the overhead costs of technology acquisition and 
providing licensed technology to domestic producers at a lower cost. The rent 
management required in this case was the ability to re-allocate licenses and to ensure 
that the search for technologies driven by the public sector did not get captured by 
specific interests in manufacturing. A combination of political factors allowed the 
Taiwanese state to achieve this rent management, as outlined in Wade (1990), and 
discussed further below. In Malaysia, technology acquisition depended to a significant 
degree on attracting high technology multinationals as well as the credibility of the 
state in providing rents that were implicitly conditional on technology transfer. In this 
case, rents were available to high technology foreign investors, but conditional on 
their ability to bring in superior technologies not otherwise available. The 
mechanisms through which rents were offered involved prioritization in infrastructure 
provision, the subsidization of training, and the protection of multinational profits by 
ensuring that redistributive demands within the country would be satisfied without 
affecting multinational profits (Jomo and Edwards 1993; Khan 2000b).  
 
With the advent of the WTO, organizing direct subsidies to infant industries will be 
more difficult in the future. Therefore, indirect subsidies, and other benefits for 
learning industries, and industries bringing in high value-added technologies must be 
considered. Even industries in advanced countries receive massive implicit subsidies 
in the form of differential taxation, prioritized infrastructure provision, public 
subsidies that provide them with an educated and healthy workforce.  
 
States possessing the capacity to manage the rents that are involved in the learning 
process will inevitably appear different from states whose capacity is limited to 
maintaining the horizontal competitiveness of markets. In the next section, we will 
examine some of the diverse ways in which states have managed learning rents during 
the catching up period in successful late developers. Here, we present some evidence 
showing that the crude cross-country data do not support the hypothesis that economic 
growth in developing countries has been dependent on the achievement of a good 
investment climate defined by stable property rights, a good rule of law, low 
corruption and low expropriation risk. 
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Figure 3 The Weakness of Investment Climate Explanations of Growth 1980-90 
 
These variables are summarized in Knack and Keefer’s consolidated property rights 
index. Plotting this crudely against the economic growth rates of countries for the 
1980s and 1990s (in Figure 3) shows that the advocated positive relationship is based 
on a misreading of the data. While there is a positive relationship when we pool all 
countries, a closer look at developing countries shows that rapidly growing 
(converging) and less rapidly growing (diverging) developing countries both display 
an almost identical range of variation in terms of their investment climate defined in 
the conventional way. However, because the number of countries in the converging 
group was typically smaller, the regression line appears to have a positive slope, even 
though the goodness of fit is typically very weak. The lesson to be learned here is not 
that investment conditions defined in the conventional sense are unimportant, but 
rather that rapidly growing countries had institutional capacities for catching up that 
are not captured in the conventional theoretical models.  
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Governance and Growth 1990-2003
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Figure 4 The Weakness of Investment Climate Explanations of Growth 1990-2003 
Identifying and developing rent-management capacities on a country-by-country basis 
must be a critical part of any moves towards setting up a developmental state that can 
organize a strategy for catching up. It follows that assisting developing countries to 
develop appropriate rent-management capacities can be an important way to help 
raise living standards more rapidly. While developing countries are often advised to 
let the market take its course, it is worth noting that rent-management capacities are 
recognized as extremely important in advanced countries. When the US courts 
considered whether to allow Microsoft to continue making monopoly profits or to 
break it up, regulators effectively considered the effects of Microsoft’s rents on its 
rate of innovation and that of other competitors. These are sophisticated state 
capacities, and while mistakes are occasionally made, advanced countries do not rely 
on the market alone to ensure rapid innovation and productivity growth. The need for 
state rent-management capacities is if anything even greater in developing countries. 
Here the challenge is not the acceleration of innovation but rather the acceleration of 
learning. However, as in advanced countries, states in developing countries have rent-
management systems of varying capacity, and these determine the likelihood of 
making mistakes and the likelihood of timely rectification. Of course, developing 
country states can make mistakes, and past interventionist attempts have often gone 
wrong. However, it does not follow that developing countries should therefore 
abandon the development of rent-management capacities and rely on the market.  
 
3 The Compatibility of Rent-Management Institutions and Political Settlements 
Our core argument is that managing rents for technology acquisition is not just 
constrained by state capacities, but also and often primarily by political constraints 
that prevent specific strategies of rent management from being implemented. The 
complexity here is that a number of quite different strategies of rent management can 
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be observed in the Asian context, and we argue that this explains why a group of 
countries with quite different internal political configurations have performed well. 
Our explanation for this is that while their internal political configurations were 
different, each of these configurations allowed the effective implementation of 
different and quite specific strategies of rent management for technology acquisition. 
At the same time, other Asian countries did far worse when they tried to implement 
rent management strategies that were superficially similar to the strategies in one or 
other of the successful countries, but these strategies were in fact incompatible with 
their specific internal political configurations. In these cases, which were more 
numerous, the rents intended to create incentives for technology acquisition became 
damaging rents that in some cases were much worse in their effect than if they had 
never been created.  
 
We would like to emphasize an advantage of looking at industrial policy through the 
lens of rent management: while some rents are critical for enhancing growth prospects 
in developing countries, others are very damaging (Khan 2000a provides a discussion 
of different types of rents). From a policy perspective, potentially growth-enhancing 
rents can become growth reducing if the rent-management capacities of the state are 
missing. For instance, potentially dynamic infant industry subsidies can become 
growth reducing for the economy if they are allocated without proper conditions and 
without the state capacity to monitor and withdraw subsidies in underperforming 
industries. The configuration of rights and powers that enables emerging capitalism in 
a developing country to catch up with advanced countries is in our view the modern 
equivalent of the system of compulsion that was created for early capitalism by the 
distribution of property rights brought about by the primitive accumulation described 
by Wood 2002. Our argument is that the additional institutional conditions for 
compulsion, the rent management strategies discussed earlier and necessary in late 
developers can themselves vary significantly given different internal political 
configurations of power, and their relative success depends on the “compatibility” of 
these institutions with these pre-existing distributions of power. 
 
Table 1 points out that when we look at the difference between more and less 
successful examples of learning rents, the critical differences lie in the rent-
management capacities of the state. The same is true of redistributive rents, the 
transfers and subsidies that maintain political stability in all countries. If transfers and 
subsidies to redistribute incomes are managed well by the state, the result is political 
stability. If they multiply out of control, the result can be economic stagnation. This 
too is obvious, but it is often not recognized that effective rent-management capacities 
are critical for the success of the social transformation that developing countries are 
experiencing.  
 
Following this framework, we examine actual rent management strategies in different 
Asian countries and we look for the institutional and political conditions that allowed 
the effective implementation of the specific strategy. Conversely, in countries where 
technological upgrading was relatively much slower, we look at the attempted rent 
management strategies and the specific institutional and political capacities that may 
have prevented the proper implementation of the strategy. This is particularly useful 
when the rent management strategies in the successful and less successful countries 
were superficially quite similar.  
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Table 1 Rents and Corresponding Rent Management Capacities 
Type of Rent Rent-Management Economic Outcome 
Monopoly Rent Created in response to special interest group pressure  Negative 
Successful Learning 
Rents 
(Infant Industry 
Subsidies, Prioritization 
of Infrastructure, 
Temporary Monopolies) 
Benefits conditional on performance, 
institutional and political capacity for 
monitoring and rent-withdrawal 
Very positive 
Failed Learning Rents 
Powerful groups can protect rents, state lacks 
capacity to independently allocate rents, or 
monitor or withdraw rents from 
underperforming enterprises 
Very negative 
Viable Redistributive 
Rents 
Extent of redistribution effectively controlled, 
lobbying for these rents kept separate from 
management of learning rents 
Mildly negative but 
positive if benefit of 
political stability 
included 
Damaging 
Redistributive Rents 
Growing redistribution, unstable coalitions, 
redistributive coalitions protect inefficient 
learning rents 
Very negative 
 
 
 
South and East Asia – Diverse industrialization experiences  
 
South Korea 1960s to 1980s 
In the South Korean case, technological catching up was led by large holding 
companies, the chaebol, who were given various forms of protection and subsidies to 
allow them to engage in learning and thereby catch up with advanced countries. In a 
sense, this was the classic infant industry strategy. For this system of rent-allocation 
to work, the state had to operate a rent-management system that involved the setting 
of export and other performance targets, and making pragmatic judgments about 
performance based on observed results. The success of the South Korean rent-
management system depended critically on a balance of power between the chaebol 
and the state that prevented inefficient firms from protecting their subsidies if the state 
decided to withdraw them. The absence of social factions such as the intermediate 
class factions observed in South Asia or factions led by the landed elites denied the 
chaebol the opportunity of offering to share rents with powerful social forces in 
exchange for their support in protecting inefficient rents (Kohli 1994; Woo-Cumings 
1997; Khan 1998, 1999). The state on the other hand had no incentive to support 
inefficient capitalists because it could get bigger economic benefits (and kickbacks) 
by supporting the dynamic capitalists and weeding out the less dynamic ones 
(Amsden 1989; Khan 2000b). This route of social and economic transformation 
would be difficult to replicate in many contemporary developing countries where 
capitalists can easily buy themselves political protection by paying factions within or 
outside the state to protect their inefficient rents even if other state agencies try to 
remove them. Moreover, explicit subsidies to large companies like the chaebol would 
be difficult to organize in the contemporary consensus against explicit subsidies, 
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supported by the WTO and other organizations. Thus, far from being the paradigmatic 
case of industrial policy, the South Korean success was based on rather unique 
conditions. It depended on the compatibility of a specific rent management strategy 
with an internal distribution of factional power within the groups that could 
potentially have offered to make alliances with individual capitalists in exchange for a 
share of the rents they were getting from the state.  
 
Malaysia 1970s to 1990s 
In the Malaysian case, technology acquisition was accelerated by providing incentives 
for high-technology multinational companies to invest in Malaysia and provide 
backward linkages to domestic producers. In stark contrast to the experience of many 
other developing countries, the multinationals that came to Malaysia were mainly 
high-technology companies. This was not an accident. Malaysia was offering 
incentives that most developing countries would find very difficult to offer, and even 
more difficult to manage with credibility without multinationals free riding on the 
hidden subsidies and failing to bring in and transfer advanced technologies. The 
“incentives” the Malaysians offered took the form of prioritized provision of 
infrastructure to suit the needs of foreign investors, and the credible protection of 
foreign investors from internal redistributive demands. The latter was particularly 
important because Malaysia’s internal redistributive needs were entirely met by taxing 
domestic capitalists. The political arrangements that were arrived at in the early 
seventies through the National Front government credibly resolved Malaysia’s 
internal redistributive conflicts through internal redistribution. Investors could easily 
perceive that Malaysia’s claim that multinational rents and profits would be protected 
was a credible promise. Contrast this with the unstable political situation in most 
developing countries and we can easily see why the typical developing country would 
not have any bargaining power with multinationals over the type of technology they 
were offering to bring in. It is not surprising that multinationals in the typical 
developing country bring in mundane technologies to produce relatively low quality 
consumer goods for the domestic market. These technologies offer rapid cost recovery 
and expose the multinational to the lowest degree of political risk from large sunk 
costs and lengthy local learning horizons. But equally, for such a strategy to work and 
for multinational to actually deliver, the state would also have to have a credible 
threat of withdrawing privileges from specific companies that failed to meet 
expectations. The centralized organization of UMNO, the dominant political party in 
Malaysia, prevented the construction of alliances between particular multinationals 
and factions within the state whose support could be purchased to protect low 
technology investments. These Malaysian conditions were similar to the credible 
threat that the equally centralized KMT could use in Taiwan in the fifties to ensure 
that foreign partners in joint ventures did not free ride on the incentives provided by 
the state (Wade 1988). The Malaysian state also ensured that domestic learning would 
take place by insisting on technology transfer to subcontractors and on local content. 
But in the end, the Malaysian state could do all this because the platform that 
Malaysia offered to multinationals was much better than that offered by most of its 
competitors. Thus, Malaysian success too was based on very specific political 
conditions that a) allowed multinationals to be offered very attractive incentives b) 
credibly protected them from internal redistributive threats c) prevented them from 
free riding. These conditions included the isolation of the predominantly ethnic 
Chinese capitalists in the domestic society who could be taxed to maintain domestic 
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political stability and who could then be rewarded by ensuring their participation in 
the backward and forward linkages opened up by multinational investment. At the 
same time, the centralized organization of the politically dominant intermediate 
classes ensured that rent allocation to multinationals could by managed without 
descending into wasteful and unnecessary transfers to foreigners without any 
technological payback (Jomo and Edwards 1993; Khan 2000b). Clearly, it may be 
difficult for other countries to repeat the Malaysian experience without internal 
political conditions that allowed them to achieve similar things.  
 
Taiwan 1950s to 1980s 
In the Taiwanese case, an important element of technological progress was the rapid 
acquisition of advanced technologies by small-scale industries in the private sector. 
This was driven by a very specific rent management strategy that deployed the state to 
acquire high-productivity technologies through state-led technology licensing and 
subsidizing the provision of this technology to the private sector. At the same time, 
key intermediate inputs were provided to the private sector through a well-run and 
efficient public sector. The rent management involved here was in the coordination of 
acquiring the most appropriate technologies. Once these technologies were made 
available to the private sector, learning was enforced by ensuring that a relatively 
large number of firms in the private sector would have access to these technologies, 
and competition would favor the firms that were better at raising productivity rapidly 
through learning (Wade 1990). For this rent-management system to work, the state 
needed to be able to distance itself institutionally and politically from a competitive 
private sector, so that rent seeking by individual firms within this sector did not affect 
state decisions on technology policy. This too can be difficult to repeat in other 
countries where the state is not artificially separated from the private sector as it was 
in Taiwan. Because of historical accidents, the Taiwanese state was led largely by 
mainland Chinese following their expulsion from mainland China in 1949 and the 
business sector was composed largely of local Taiwanese. This political distance 
proved to be very useful in operating this rent-management system because local 
business interests could not influence state-led technology acquisition to favor 
particular groups at the expense of national interests, nor could any group use political 
power to acquire monopoly power in the domestic market. At the same time, the 
centralized organization of the KMT and the ability of the leadership to override all 
internal factions (in a context of martial law throughout this period) prevented 
coalitions from protecting inefficient capitalists or public sector enterprises.  
 
India 1950s to 1980 
The Nehruvian strategy of catching up through licensing investments in the private 
sector, the provision of implicit subsidies to key sectors through protection and 
subsidized inputs and technology acquisition driven by significant investments in the 
public sector had elements of many of the strategies followed in East Asia. Yet the 
results of the Indian experiment were far less significant in terms of growth of output 
and productivity, and the attempt was almost entirely abandoned in 1991. But a 
decade or more before that, the licensing system had effectively collapsed. From 1980 
onwards, Indian growth took off led by niche private sector activities that began to 
exploit the capacities built up by Indian industrial policy in ways that the industrial 
policy regime itself could not achieve. If we look at the period prior to 1980, the 
lackluster results of the Indian strategy can largely be explained in terms of a failure 
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of rent management by the Indian state. Despite the Indian state being aware of its 
failure at least as early as the mid sixties (as the Dutt Committee that reported in 1968 
outlined in detail), licenses were being used by big business groups to acquire 
monopoly power and excess capacity, and attempts to re-allocate licenses were 
consistently failing. In addition, in the public sector, subsidies were effectively 
captured by privileged managers and workers as redistributive rents rather than 
serving as learning rents that could accelerate catching up. Ultimately, domestic 
consumers paid the price by being forced to buy relatively low quality products in 
protected domestic markets. A number of political factors in India made these rent 
management strategies unworkable. First, business groups in India could rapidly 
acquire autonomous political power by forming alliances with any of the many 
numerous political factions that dominated the Indian political process. The 
availability of a large number of possible protectors of inefficient rents in India in turn 
reflected the fragmented nature of the intermediate class factions in India, and their 
availability for protecting and capturing rents that they saw as redistributive rents. The 
failure to construct disciplined national organizations that could separate learning 
rents from redistributive rents is the immediate manifestation of the fragmented 
clientelism that characterizes Indian politics (Khan 1998, 2000b). A similar linkup of 
public sector employees with broader political factions made restructuring of the 
public sector just as difficult. Thus while the Nehruvian system was very effective in 
building up a base of heavy industries and human capital to service these sectors, it 
failed to generate rapid productivity growth and quality improvements that could have 
made this industrial policy system viable.  
 
Bangladesh and Pakistan 1960 to 1970 
Pakistan and Bangladesh provide an example of a somewhat different South Asian 
rent management strategy in the sixties that was superficially closer to the South 
Korean system. But once again, the problem was that this rent management system 
was incompatible with the internal power balances that eventually made it impossible 
to discipline non-performers. In the end, this industrial policy strategy also proved to 
be unsustainable. The institutional strategy consisted of a combination of import 
barriers and directed subsidies to a small number of big business groups with an 
explicit aim of acquiring technology rapidly and pushing the Pakistan economy 
(which included Bangladesh at that time) into an export-oriented one. Initially, the 
Pakistan economy was a star performer in the early sixties, with growth rates of 
output and exports matching those of the East Asian economies. But once the easy 
import substitution was over and pressure had to be created on the new industrialists 
to improve productivity and quality, the system ran into trouble. The Pakistani state 
discovered, like the Indian one, that subsidy recipients in industry had formed 
alliances with politically powerful factions and re-allocations of resources were not 
possible. This was despite the fact that Pakistan was at that time formally a 
dictatorship (Khan 1998, 1999, 2000b). Nevertheless, the power of factions led by the 
intermediate classes could not be overridden, particularly as these factions began to 
challenge the pro-capitalist strategy of the state by mobilizing broad social groups on 
ideologies of socialist populism in both East and West Pakistan. Rational capitalists 
could not but form mutually beneficial alliances with particular factions whereby the 
capitalist and the faction shared the state-created rent, and the faction protected the 
capitalist from rent re-allocation even though learning and productivity growth was 
not proceeding according to plan.  
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India and Bangladesh after 1980 
While the Indian subcontinent struggled with industrial policies, their implementation 
and efficacy became increasingly compromised. A series of reforms began in the 
subcontinental countries that proceeded along different routes towards liberalization. 
In India, the process formally took off only after the 1991 balance of payments crisis, 
which was seized on by the reformist Rao government to push through a gradual 
reduction of the scope of licensing and a gradual reduction of tariff protection. 
However, India’s growth had already taken off around 1980 before much of these 
relatively minor changes had been announced. This, together with the fact that the 
scope of the liberalization was relatively minor, and could not explain the significant 
acceleration in growth that had taken place led economists to suggest that the most 
important factor was the change in the policy stance of the state. The collapse of 
industrial policy by the early eighties and the growing number of policy statements in 
favor of the private sector apparently created new confidence and animal spirits that 
could explain the acceleration of private investment that triggered the growth spurt 
(Rodrik and Subramanian 2004). As Rodrik (2004) later also points out, this is an 
incomplete explanation because it ignores the capacities that were built up during the 
industrial policy stage that private entrepreneurs were later to exploit when market 
opportunities emerged. Thus, India’s global comparative advantage in outsourcing, 
software and in some sectors of generic pharmaceuticals did not just emerge overnight 
once licensing disappeared. Rather, these critical capacities had been built up 
precisely during the industrial policy period. But, the licensing system, while it failed 
to provide compulsions for productivity growth across the economy, inadvertently 
also prevented sectors that had acquired some capacity from taking off under private 
initiative. Liberalization, or rather the collapse of the licensing system that preceded 
it, thus worked by allowing niches of capacity to take off even while the overall 
industrial policy structure had failed.  
 
To a lesser extent, a similar story was unfolding in neighboring Bangladesh. Here the 
industrial policy regime initiated by Pakistan had collapsed as early as 1971. There 
followed an interlude of socialist populism that led to a deepening of the crisis as the 
dominant clientelist factions sought to capture rents by nationalizing the entire 
manufacturing sector. Liberalization began under military governments, in this case 
through privatizations and a gradual cutting back of tariff protection as in the Indian 
case. As in India, the growth spurt that began in Bangladesh in the 1980s was driven 
by the private sector developing new niche markets. In this case, given the much 
lower levels of industrial capacity that had been built up during the industrial policy 
period, the drivers of growth were low technology sectors like garments, cosmetics 
and pharmaceuticals aimed at the domestic market and low technology primary sector 
exports like shrimps. Despite the very vulnerable technological base of the new 
growth, a decade of rampant primitive accumulation had resulted in the growth of a 
broad-based emerging small capitalist sector, and these new capitalists have been 
driving a bottom-up variant of capitalism that has produced growth without rapid 
technology acquisition. 
 
The preceding analysis has some important implications for the analysis of the 
liberalization-led growth in India and to a lesser extent in Bangladesh. Rodrik (2004) 
rightly points out that Indian growth in particular cannot be understood without 
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factoring in the capacities that were built up during the industrial policy phase. 
However, our analysis suggests that it would be wrong to interpret this as an 
indication of the success of Indian industrial policy. It is exactly the reverse. The 
failure of the industrial policy regime to sustain itself meant that capacities were built 
up that could not be utilized, and it was the collapse of the industrial policy regime 
that has allowed the exploitation of these capacities in new niche activities. University 
graduates staffing call centers are the most dramatic indicators of the potential waste 
that has now become manifest. But more serious is the fact that with the withdrawal 
of state strategies of subsidizing potential high-productivity sectors, the growth of 
future capacity is now highly vulnerable. This does not mean that Indian growth is 
doomed to decline. If growth continues rapidly in such a large economy, multinational 
led technology transfer could begin, and could sustain growth in the foreseeable 
future. But growth could have been even higher and more broadly based if a viable 
industrial policy could have been implemented. The policy challenge is to identify the 
sources of industrial policy failure in countries like India and to devise technology 
acquisition strategies that are compatible with pre-existing political configurations. 
Alternatively, such an analysis can also open up domestic political debates about how 
to change political configurations through political activity (as in Malaysia in the late 
seventies) that may then allow the implementation of other variants of accelerated 
technology acquisition strategies.  
 
The Asian experience thus provides a range of institutional approaches to industrial 
policy as well as quite different outcomes. We have tried to make sense of these 
outcomes by looking at the compatibility of the rent management required under each 
of these strategies with the evolving political configuration of each country. The 
relative power of different groups and factions that could intervene in the effective 
implementation of industrial policy explains for us much of the variance in both 
industrial policy approaches and their relative success. Some of the important points 
discussed above are summarized in Table 3. 
 
 
Latin America – a resounding failure? 
 
Unfavorable comparisons of the Latin American industrialization experience with that 
of East Asia are commonplace (e.g. Chan 1987, Lin 1988, Fishlow 1989, Gereffi 
1989, Gereffi and Wyman 1990, Harberger 1988, Jenkins 1991, Palma 2004, Ranis 
and Orrock 1985, UNCTAD Trade and Development Report 2003). This is not 
surprising: With the exception of Ecuador and Paraguay that did not begin to 
industrialize until the late 1960s, Latin America embarked on industrialization many 
decades before the East Asian NICs. Yet, despite of initial successes that saw some of 
the core countries, such as Brazil and Mexico, forge ahead of the East Asian NICs in 
the 1960s and into the 1970s, the pace of Latin American industrialization has now 
fallen far behind the few successful East Asian cases of catching-up. If, between 1945 
and 1980, Latin American GDP grew on average at 5.6% p.a., and its manufacturing 
output at 6.8% p.a., (Cárdenas, Ocampo and Thorp 2000, Haber 2005), the picture has 
changed drastically ever since. In the last two decades of the 20th century, 
manufacturing value added grew by 9.1% in East Asia, 6.5% in South Asia, 4.8% in 
the Middle East and Nord Africa, 1.7% in Sub-Saharan Africa, and 1.4% in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. 
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Table 2 summarizes basic comparative indicators of growth and productivity 
performance in the two regions: 
 
Table 2: GDP per capita and per worker relative to the US, gross fixed capital 
formation in East Asia and Latin America 1960-2004 
 Proportion of US 
GDP per capita 
(current international $)
Proportion of US 
output per worker 
(constant 1996 prices) 
Gross fixed 
capital formation 
(average growth 
rates, constant 
2000 US $) 
 
 
1960 1980 2000 1960 1980 2000 1965-
1980 
1981-
2004 
East Asia 
Hong Kong 0.23 0.58 0.78 0.19 0.46 0.80 6.9 3.8 
Singapore 0.17 0.50 0.80 0.21 0.56 0.671) 14.2 4.8 
Malaysia 0.19 0.24 0.26 0.20 0.28 0.43 11.5 5.1 
South Korea 0.12 0.22 0.42 0.15 0.28 0.57 17.9 8.0 
Taiwan 0.11 0.27 0.55 0.13 0.32 0.602) n/a n/a 
Thailand 0.09 0.13 0.19 0.07 0.12 0.20 9.6 4.7 
China 0.05 0.05 0.11 0.04 0.04 0.09 8.9 12.2 
Philippines 0.17 0.15 0.11 0.17 0.20 0.13 7.9 1.3 
Latin America 
Argentina 0.60 0.50 0.33 0.62 0.66 0.40 5.1 0.5 
Uruguay 0.46 0.36 0.29 0.48 0.46 0.38 8.4 -2.7 
Venezuela 0.35 0.39 0.20 0.83 0.55 0.27 4.9 0.7 
Mexico 0.33 0.38 0.27 0.44 0.54 0.38 9.4 1.2 
Chile 0.31 0.26 0.29 0.38 0.36 0.39 2.4 4.3 
Peru  0.26 0.24 0.13 0.33 0.36 0.16 3.6 1.0 
Brazil 0.19 0.30 0.22 0.24 0.39 0.30 6.4 0.7 
Colombia 0.19 0.20 0.16 0.27 0.31 0.18 [12.9]*) [4.6]*)
Paraguay 0.15 0.20 0.13 0.24 0.31 0.16 14.2 -1.8 
Bolivia 0.17 0.15 0.08 0.22 0.22 0.10 2.1 2.1 
Ecuador 0.17 0.22 0.14 0.20 0.32 0.17 8.4 0.3 
 
Sources: Calculations from Alan Heston, Robert Summer and Bettina Aten, Penn World Tables 
Version 6.1., Centre for International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP), 
October 2002 and from World Development Indicators, World Bank, April 2006. 
1) Most recent figures from 1996, 2)1998; *)Figures for Colombia in current US $ 
 
Even a cursory glance at the data suggests that Latin America experienced a rupture in 
its industrialization process in the early 1980s, precisely at a time at which the East 
Asian NICs managed to transform their initial catching-up efforts into a dynamic and 
sustainable process of capitalist expansion and development. As Weisbrot notes, “[t]o 
find a growth performance in Latin America that is even close to the failure of the last 
25 years, one has to go back more than a century, and choose a 25-year period that 
includes both World War I and the Great Depression.” (2006: 2). 
 
This rupture has mostly been attributed to two main factors:  
 
First, heterodox and orthodox economists alike criticized the process of heavy (or 
second-stage) import-substituting industrialization in core Latin American countries, 
mostly initiated in the 1960s, for having created undesirable and unsustainable 
Second Draft: August 2006.as+gd.2.19.08 
 20
macroeconomic imbalances. The mostly heterodox Latin American critics of 
cepalismo – the industrialization strategy advocated by Prebisch and CEPAL 
(Comisión Económica para America Latina) at the time – scrutinized what they 
regarded as a distorted and dependant pattern of industrial growth resulting from an 
incomplete or wrong-headed industrial strategy. Dependistas and nationalists alike 
lamented the bias of industrial development towards the capital-intensive production 
of consumer durables, underpinning and entrenching inequitable consumption 
patterns, and the increasing domination of manufacturing by foreign TNCs. The latter 
were seen not only to siphon off profits freely to their advanced home economies, but 
also increasingly to expand their activities downstream into the production of wage 
goods in competition with already hard-pressed domestic producers, rather than to 
have their technological potential leveraged in favor of the formation of viable 
national capital good sectors (e.g. Colin 2004). In addition, both heterodox and (neo-) 
liberal commentators grew increasingly worried about the monetary and balance of 
payment crises associated with the second phase of Latin American import-
substituting industrialization policies (Cardoso and Fishlow 1992). Differently from 
their heterodox colleagues, neoliberals attributed these latter distortions not to 
mistakes and imbalances in the chosen industrial strategies, but to the very existence 
of any such strategy: Cepalismo had been mistaken in its pessimism about the limited 
developmental potential of world trade that had grown rapidly after World War II, and 
Latin America was paying the price for having tampered with free markets through 
excessive over-regulation and ineffective protectionism, engendering unproductive 
rent-seeking, corruption and macroeconomic instability.  
 
Second, external factors are widely regarded to have played a crucial role in the 
difficulties and decline of the Latin American industrialization experience (e.g. Singh 
1993). Other than much of continental Western Europe after World War II, and East 
Asia – especially South Korea and Taiwan – in the 1950s and 1960s, Latin America 
never collected any windfall Cold War funding or soft loans from the US. Quite the 
contrary – what US-based funding went to Latin America systematically served to 
undermine the kind of structural changes, such as thorough land reforms, that were 
essential to successful transformations in East Asia (Kay 2002). Nor were advanced 
economies prepared or in a position, in the 1940s, to grant the same market access to 
light manufacturing consumer products from Latin America that, two decades later, 
they provided for very similar export products from what were to become the East 
Asian NICs.  
 
It is true that had the timing of the Latin American industrialization process been 
different, and had Latin America occupied a geo-strategic frontier position in the Cold 
War rather than constituting the ‘backyard’ of the anti-communist US, we might 
perceivably now be contemplating a success story rather than pondering over the 
reasons for failure. Similarly, the internal criticisms of the path of forced 
industrialization in much of Latin America in the post-World War II period certainly 
pinpointed important problems. 
 
Even so, these observations leave a number of pertinent questions unanswered: Why, 
for example, have Latin American economies been unable to mobilize their resources 
under any policy and political regime to the same extent as their East Asian 
counterparts? As is well known, the prolonged and certainly varied Latin American 
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industrialization experience has been characterized by much lower savings rates than 
in East Asia (Gavin, Hausmann and Talvi 1997): the average Latin American savings 
rate in the period 1960 – 2005 peaked at 22.5% in 1977, compared to performances of 
35% and above since the early 1980s in the first-tier East Asian NICs, and since the 
mid 1990s in the second-tier East Asian NICs, such as Malaysia and Thailand.3 Yet, 
at one time or another, the majority of Latin American economies adopted very 
similar industrialization policies to those that played out so favorably in the East 
Asian NICs: vertical policies to select strategic targets (winners) and concomitant 
nationalizations, high import tariffs followed by import licensing regimes, a 
supplementary arsenal of supporting policies including selective and subsidized credit 
access, tax exemptions, favorable access to foreign exchange, regulations on national 
content requirements, stimulation of technology transfer and complementary FDI, and 
export subsidies. If the heterodox critiques of cepalismo are correct, and this produced 
a distorted and dependant pattern of industrial growth, why did the same policies 
produce such a different outcome in Latin America compared to East Asia? If, on the 
other hand, liberalization policies were the superior policy choice, as neoliberal 
commentators have claimed and many Latin American governments of the 1980s and 
90s have chosen to believe, why did the liberalization shock not yield better results? If 
South Korea and Taiwan were particularly favored by external factors, such as 
massive US aid flows, easy market access for manufacturing exports and political 
tolerance of radical land reforms, why have second-tier East Asian NICs, such as 
Thailand and Malaysia that could not count on these factors, recently been more 
successful than any Latin American economy? 
 
The approach developed in this chapter suggests that the success or failure of rent-
management strategies for industrialization is largely determined by the compatibility 
of technological and institutional strategies for late development with political 
constraints arising from inner-societal power constellations as well as from 
transnational – external – influences. The East Asian NICs succeeded because their 
various rent management strategies to promote industrialization did not lead to 
political destabilization. In the South Asian Sub-continent, a political configuration 
favorable to highly fragmented clientelist alliances between industrialists and the 
organizationally powerful middle classes led to the breakdown of more or less classic 
infant industry strategies.  
 
In Latin America, less fragmented, but no less powerful alliances between strong 
landed elites and emerging industrialists led to a similar breakdown. Moore (1966), in 
his seminal work on different routes to industrialization and modern (capitalist) 
transformation in Western Europe and Asia, characterizes in particular the Japanese 
and German route to industrialization as an authoritarian/fascist “revolution from 
 
3 There have been exceptions to the ‘eternal Latin American ceiling’ of a 20% savings rate: Brazil in 
the 1950s–70s, Argentina in the 1960s and 70s, Chile in the 1990s all registered savings rates of 
between 25-30%, with oil-exporting Venezuela achieving an average savings rate of over 40% between 
1950 and 1975. However, whether or not exceptional circumstances such as the discovery of oil in 
Venezuela came into play, even those above-average performances all show a downward trend over 
time in stark contrast to the sharp upward trend in the East Asian NICs since the 1980s. Nor did they 
translate into a sustainable upward trend of GDP per capita growth rates despite of promising 
performances in Brazil, Mexico and Colombia in the 1970s (Maddison 2003). 
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above”. The essential characteristics of this route are the persistence of strong landed 
elites and the continued use of political rather than market-based mechanisms to 
ensure an adequate supply of (agricultural) labor and the concomitant failure of 
emerging industrialists to achieve political emancipation from landed oligarchies on 
their own. Instead, the state takes on the task of mediation between landed and 
industrial interests and, eventually, that of social transformation. In the early stages of 
industrialization this takes the form of semi-parliamentary ‘oligarchic’ systems of 
government. In the later stages of industrialization, the emergence and rapid growth of 
an urban working class and a growing requirement of state and administrative 
modernization lead to a ‘revolution from above’ through inclusive populist-
authoritarian regimes, whether of a fascist or a conservative-military nature that 
‘oversee’ capitalist transformation and the eventual decline of landed elites through 
co-option as well as repression of working class interests and their middle-class allies. 
Apart from Germany and Japan, Greece, (to some extent) Italy, Spain and some 
Balkan countries are examples of this transition route (Mouzelis 1986). Latin America 
shares many of these characteristics, but is different in important aspects: Its colonial 
history as an exporter of natural resources meant that its landed elites were 
comparatively much stronger than their European or Japanese counterparts. 
Importantly, this meant that, other than in many successful late developers, land 
reforms did not precede industrialization, but were only initiated half-heartedly at late 
stages of industrialization with the primary goal of creating larger internal markets 
(Kay 2002). Furthermore, the timing and external environment of industrialization in 
Latin America were different: working class opposition to ‘oligarchic’ rule and 
authoritarian transformation emerged later and was weaker than in Europe, not least 
because of later and dependent industrialization, but was much more premature 
relative to the formation of an urban middle class. This, in turn, was at least partly a 
consequence of the minimalist and mercantilist state structure Latin American 
inherited from colonial domination, which impeded, or at least slowed down, the 
evolution of a modern and professional state apparatus (Rueschemeyer, Stephens 
Huber & Stephens 1992, Mahoney and vom Hau 2005). 
 
Together, these and other political factors meant that Latin America, rather than 
undergoing a successful ‘revolution from above’, experienced unstable political 
cycles, alternating between urban populism – of both an authoritarian as well more 
truly popular kind - and narrowly elitist clientelist regimes. Whereas urban populism 
refers to attempts by the state to resist the power of landed elites through the 
mobilization and co-option of working class and middle class interest in support of 
capitalist industrialization, elitist clientelism in the Latin American context refers to 
alliances that aligned the interests of industrialists, parts of the urban middle classes 
and landowners against perceived threats from the subaltern classes, including urban 
and agricultural workers as well as peasants (Mouzelis 1986). In the South Asian Sub-
continent, big business groups could form alliances with middle class fractions that, 
while shifting and fragmented across multiple ethnic, religious, tribal and political 
lines of division, ultimately allowed monopolists to build up fairly reliable power 
bases. While these alliances undermined the state’s capacity to impose a national 
infant industry strategy, they at least rendered possible relatively successful ad-hoc 
private sector strategies of capital accumulation in niche markets, profiting from 
previous state-led investments. By contrast, in Latin America, the century-old 
stalemate between strong landed interests, on the one hand, and gradually 
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consolidating urban and industrial interests, on the other, prevented a stable power 
base for private sector industrial accumulation from establishing itself. As 
industrialization proceeded to the more large-scale and capital-intensive second stage 
of import-substituting industrialization, neither populist states nor clientelist pactos 
could, in the longer term, respond effectively to the growing demands on co-
ordination, planning and adaptation capacities, required for a high-value added large 
scale technological strategy. Populist state control as well as clientelist alliances 
increasingly disintegrated through fractionalization. 
 
Brazil 1930s to 1980s 
Following the detrimental impact of the Great Depression on Brazil’s coffee-based 
agrarian export economy, the country embarked on a strategy of state-led 
industrialization that lasted until the early 1980s. Of the Latin American NICs, the 
Brazilian industrialization strategy and experience, although much longer drawn out, 
comes closest to that of South Korea. In both cases an early phase of light import-
substituting industrialization, directed mainly at domestic markets, was rapidly 
followed by a strongly state-controlled ‘Big Push’ strategy that sought to promote 
heavy industrialization through the allocation of learning-rents to target sectors and 
industries. In both countries, industrial transformation unfolded under the auspices of 
exceptionally autonomous states, governed and controlled for most of the relevant 
periods by authoritarian military regimes. Many of the policy tools employed were 
similar, including initial high import tariffs, import licensing, directed credit policies, 
and direct state investment in industry and supportive infrastructure. Initially, at least, 
results also were comparable: In the period 1900-1987, Brazil was the largest growing 
economy in the world (Maddison 1993), with the highest growth performance 
following a massive build up of productive capacity since the 1950s, in the energy, 
capital goods and heavy industry sectors. Between 1950 and 1980, growth rates of up 
to 10% p.a. were not exceptional.  
 
There are important differences with the case of South Korea: Above all, the 
superficial similarity between the two states in terms of their high degrees of 
autonomy from society was, in fact, of a very different kind: The South Korean state 
was not only autonomous, but also very much ‘embedded’ through close links with 
the private business sector, ensuring efficient information flows and bargaining 
mechanisms between these (Evans 1995, Chang and Cheema 2001). By contrast, the 
Brazilian state was autonomous without any such ‘embeddedness’ in that it 
represented a centralized, often well-organized, but isolated structure without strong 
anchors in any section of society. Like the shell of an empty egg, it would crack 
whenever sufficient pressure came to bear on it. Whereas the South Korean state 
successfully wedded economic with political exclusion and repression of the 
‘subaltern’ classes, whenever industrial transformation caused social tensions, and 
thus gained a reputation of credible commitment to national and international 
industrial interests, the Brazilian state was never in a position to wean domestic 
industrial interests off their fall-back-alliance with regional oligarchies and their 
clientelist networks. The reason is, of course, that these networks existed, in the first 
place, while in South Korea Japanese colonialism had basically eliminated the power 
of landed elites. In Brazil, private business interests were, at times, co-opted by the 
state through the appointment of business leaders to cabinet positions, but sustained 
direct channels of lobbying, bargaining and interest representation between private 
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business associations and the state remained very fragmented and tied to sectoral 
rather than national levels (Ross Schneider 2004). Without such direct 
‘embeddedness’ with the industrial elite, the Brazilian state, autonomous, repressive 
and controlling as it became, was left in a technocratic limbo from which to try and 
promote industrial policies, forever frustrated by stalemates between oligarchic-
clientelist networks of landed and industrial elites, on the one hand, and popular 
demands, that over the long drawn-out process of a relatively early industrialization 
became increasingly vocal.  
 
 
Colombia 1930s to 1980s 
Colombia provides a useful contrast to Brazil in the Latin American context. As in 
Brazil, a very labor-intensive and largely coffee-based agrarian export economy had, 
by the late 19th century, created powerful landed elites operating local and regional 
clientelist networks that dominated politics and the state. Similarly to most other Latin 
American economies, Colombia underwent successive stages of easy and heavy 
import-substituting industrialization, lasting from 1930–1945 and 1945-1967, 
respectively. Differently from Brazil and many other Latin American experiences, 
though, the industrialization process remained largely private-led with the state 
playing a much more indirect role than, in particular, in Brazil, Argentina and 
Mexico. The main reason was that following two, even by Latin American standards, 
very violent periods of civil warfare (The War of the Thousand Days 1899-1902 and 
La Violencia at the end of the 1940s), the two main clientelist parties, representing a 
mix of landed and growing industrial interests, took effective control of the state. 
While tensions between urban industrialists, landed trade and business interests and, 
to some extent, the military, remained and produced shifting power balances, 
domestic capitalists, often descended from European immigrants, gradually emerged 
as the main clientelist ‘patrons’, running their own networks and influencing state 
policy-making. Thus, other than in Brazil, private business associations developed 
relatively strong national channels of direct lobbying and bargaining with the state 
(Ross Schneider 2004). This somewhat resembles the Thai process of private 
capitalist-led industrialization ‘from below’, that was dominated by a combination of 
relatively passive industrial policies, a domination of rent-seeking processes by 
competition between emerging capitalist factions and a technology acquisition 
strategy that focused on low-value added, labor intensive technologies with low 
adaptation and co-ordination costs (Khan 2000b). Industrial policy and state-created 
rents, in this context, serve the limited purpose of initial support for relatively small-
scale private accumulation processes, but are then ideally bid down through private 
sector competition. 
 
As in Thailand, an important feature of the Colombian polity post-1950s has been that 
redistributive factions with effective access to the state were limited to elitist groups, 
many of which were capitalist-led and –controlled, rather than by organizationally 
powerful non-capitalist middle and working-class factions. In both countries, 
clientelism was thus much less fragmented than, for example, in India, and the 
redistributive pressure on the state from non-capitalist interest groups less than in 
more populist and inclusive Latin American states. One indicator of the lower 
incidence of redistributive claims in the Colombian economy are the, by Latin 
American standards, relatively low rates of inflation that have also remained fairly 
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stable over the past 50 years (WDI 2006). This industrialization ‘from below’ has, 
however, been less successful in Colombia compared to Thailand, for a number of 
reasons: First, competition between capitalist-led factions has been less intensive in 
Colombia than Thailand. This is, at least in part, explained by the much larger weight 
of landed elites and interests in the Colombian clientelist settlement. This made entry 
into high-rent markets more difficult for industrial newcomers who, in contrast to 
older incumbents, often did not have long-established ties with the landed oligarchy 
and were thus at a disadvantage in terms of their political bargaining power vis-à-vis 
the state. Second, the larger role of landed interests in Colombia also meant that the 
state’s capacity to allocate rents to industrialists was more limited by the need to find 
compromises between industrial and landed interests. Third, key to the relative 
efficiency of the Thai rent-seeking system was the focus on low value-added labor-
intensive technologies that did not require long learning or strong centralized planning 
efforts. While this was also the case in Colombia during the first phase of import-
substituting industrialization in the 1930s and 40s, the Colombian state did embark, in 
the 1950s and 60s, on the promotion of more large-scale capital intensive industries, 
such as petrochemicals, basic metals, machinery, transport equipment and chemical 
products. This attempt at heavy industrialization was more short-lived in Colombia 
than in many other Latin American states, and in 1967 was replaced by a mixed 
strategy of import-substitution, technology acquisition through joint ventures with 
foreign investors and export-promotion (Ocampo 1994, Vejarano 2002). But the 
earlier attempt at promoting capital-intensive heavy industries was highly unsuitable 
to the limited rent-allocation and –monitoring capacity of the Colombian state and 
undermined the relatively low competitiveness of capitalist-led factions even further. 
In addition, the state’s reliance on FDI to promote technology transfer was even less 
than in Brazil matched by its ability to impose conditionalities conducive to high 
productivity technology transfer from TNCs. Despite a moderately successful 
‘assembly regime’, introduced in 1969, that made concessions to foreign ‘assemblers’ 
conditional on a rise in domestic components and technical assistance to local 
suppliers of parts and accessories (mainly in the automobile and electrical appliances 
industries), the ‘Malaysian route’ certainly was not open to the Colombian state. 
Apart from the inability and unwillingness of the clientelist elites to prevent alliances 
between foreign investors and domestic factions, a fourth and final factor was relevant 
in this respect: The absence of populism in Colombia and the high degree of exclusion 
of subaltern and middle classes from the political settlement did not mean that the 
state was not affected by contestation from outside this settlement. Instead, political 
contestation by excluded sectors of society took the form of (mostly) rural guerrilla 
warfare that, while largely confined to remote regions with little government 
presence, increasingly undermined the political stability of the elitist-clientelist pacts. 
While elements of such violent contestation ‘from outside the political settlement’ are 
also characteristic of Thailand, the extent and longevity of rural warfare in Colombia, 
as well as the expansion of the drug trade outside the control of the state, have 
increasingly compromised the state’s ability to attract foreign direct investment as an 
important conduit of technology transfer.  
 
Overall, the Colombian industrialization process was much slower and ‘lackluster’ 
compared to Brazil: on average, savings rates increased, at best, to only half of those 
achieved in Brazil between 1950 and 1980, as did the share of manufacturing in GDP. 
Similarly, average GDP per capita growth rates remained in the 2-3% bracket 
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(Maddison 2002). By contrast, the collapse of state-led industrial policy, when it 
came, was much less dramatic than in Brazil.  
 
Peru 1950s to 1980s 
A brief mention of Peru serves to highlight a third constellation of power in Latin 
America that has probably been the most detrimental to the prospects of successful 
capitalist-led industrial development. Ever since the 19th century, this has seen a 
coalition of heavily foreign-dominated mining and agricultural export interests at 
loggerheads with a large unionized native work force. In the case of Peru (as well as 
Bolivia), the divide between these two sectors is very sharply defined, in racial as well 
as geographical terms, with a racially mixed middle class playing only a minor role. 
This constellation of powerful (national and foreign) landed and mineral export 
interests, on the one hand, and an early mass radicalization before the emergence of a 
viable domestic industrial accumulation process, could not have been less favorable to 
a state-led catching-up industrialization project. When in 1968,, under the combined 
pressure of popular discontent with foreign ownership, rising costs, limited supplies 
of some natural resources and population pressure on land, the left-wing military 
regime of Velasco came to power with a radical agenda of import-substituting 
industrialization and agrarian inform, it stood little chance of political survival: High 
import tariff protection, tariff exemptions on imports for manufacturing industries and 
general tax exemptions did induce a strong rise in domestic investment and aggregate 
demand, but they also contributed to a rising public-sector deficit – the fiscal benefits 
paid out to domestic industrialists between 1971 and 1975 amounted to 92% of total 
internal financing of industrial investment – and inflationary pressures. Ultimately, 
the Velasco government lacked allies amongst local industrials whom it distrusted 
because of their close ties with foreign companies and the landed elite, and it could 
therefore only opt for nationalization. This not only over-stretched the limited 
planning and co-ordination capacities of the Peruvian state (Thorp 1991) – as late as 
1962, taxation in Peru had been contracted out to private firms and until 1969 central 
bank directors were appointed by private business associations (Cameron and North 
1998) - but it was a doomed strategy given strong US interests in Peru’s export 
sectors. The fate of Allende’s Chile did not leave much room for doubt in this respect. 
While some progress was made with regard to the belated land reform, the powerful 
opposition of foreign capital and landed elites meant that the only alternative path to 
late industrialization, given the weakness of domestic capital – a socialist revolution 
from below – could not succeed. Velasco’s regime factionalized and was eventually 
toppled by a right-wing military coup in 1975. No active industrial rent-management 
regime has been pursued since.  
 
 
Latin America after liberalization (1980-2000) 
Once state-led catching-up industrialization in Latin America had failed – not 
necessarily in terms of economic performance during the duration of active industrial 
policy regimes, but rather in the sense of the compatibility of these regimes with 
given political settlements outlined above - Latin America underwent a radical 
liberalization shock. Even though it goes without saying that there were considerable 
differences in the design, execution and the impact of these policies between different 
Latin American countries, the fairly radical shift towards neoliberalism was 
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sufficiently uniform to allow us to abstract from country particularities and to treat 
Latin America as region for the purpose of this brief section. 
 
In these general terms, high levels of external debt and large-scale capital flight – 
themselves a manifestation of the incompatibility of institutional and technological 
strategies with political settlements – had made Latin America more vulnerable than 
most other developing regions to international policy changes, such as the Volcker 
shock. While the 1980s were dominated by comprehensive free market reforms – 
trade liberalization, deregulation and privatization -, the 1990s saw the emergence of 
passive industrial policies aimed at improving international competitiveness through 
regional trade integration, mitigating market failure through the provision of public 
goods and stimulating productivity growth through the promotion of industries with 
positive technological externalities (Peres 1997, Kosakoff et al 1998, Melo 2001). 
 
By now, it is clear that the outcome of this policy change has been very disappointing. 
On the positive side, there were successes in terms of macroeconomic stabilization 
and significant increases in export performances (e.g. Taylor 2000, Palma 2005a, 
Dutrénit and Katz 2005). More important from a development perspective, however, 
are the clearly negative effects on productivity growth and domestic technological 
capabilities (as well as an already highly unequal income distribution), indicating that 
the increase in exports in many countries has failed to translate into backward 
linkages to the domestic economy and has, instead, occurred alongside a trend of de-
industrialization (see Table 2 above, Palma 2005a and 2005b). In other words, Latin 
America has returned to its underlying static comparative advantages of natural 
resources and unskilled labor with detrimental effects on its productivity and growth 
performance. More specifically, the change in Latin America’s productive structure 
combines specialization in fairly capital-intensive resource processing industries, 
mainly in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Colombia with a predominance of assembly 
industries, in particular in Mexico and some Central American countries (Peres 1997, 
Dutrénit and Katz 2005). This has come at the expense of high-technology sectors, 
such as electronics, semiconductors and computers (with the possible exception of the 
medium-technology automobile industries of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico and the 
aerospace and computer projects in Brazil) and some more traditional labor-intensive 
industries (Peres 1997).  
 
While static efficiency gains did occur, through the weeding out of blatantly 
inefficient companies (e.g. Ricardo Ffrench-Davis et al 2000 for Chile) in the context 
of greater import competition, and additional resources were freed up through the 
reduction of some state activity, these additional resources clearly did not translate 
into productivity increases based on accelerated learning-by doing. Thus, Cimoli and 
Katz (2004) show that the major mechanism through which liberalization is argued, 
by mainstream economists, to entail productivity as opposed to mere (one-off) 
efficiency gains – the availability of cheap(er) capital goods imports – achieved the 
direct opposite: In Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico, all of five central 
divisions in the manufacturing sector (metal working industries, automobiles, food 
processing, natural resource processing and labor-intensive manufacturing industries) 
actually shrunk during the period of liberalization. Ocampo (2004) adds the 
observation that the process of technological downgrading through the availability of 
cheaper capital imports was reinforced by a ‘disarticulation’ (or fragmentation) of the 
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production base into a small groups of world-leading, mostly foreign-owned, 
companies, on the one hand, and a large and increasing number of firms engaged in 
low-productivity and low-skill activities that by now absorb about 60% of the urban 
workforce. Importantly, there are virtually no technological spill-over effects from 
world-leading to low-skill sectors, or any other macroeconomic linkage effects 
(Ocampo 2004, Gwynne 2004 for Brazil and Palma 2005a for Mexico). Where 
technological progress is taking place this remains insulated in ‘de-linked’ or 
‘disarticulated’ MNC-dominated firm clusters that not only fail to engage in 
significant technology transfer, but partly destroy hitherto productive and viable 
domestic firms in the supplier chain (.e.g. auto-parts industry in Brazil). The case of 
Mexico’s maquila industry is perhaps the prime example, in Latin America, of 
linkage-less manufacturing (export) growth (Palma 2005a).  
 
More specifically, Palma (2003) provides ample evidence for the fact that the main 
effect of liberalization, across virtually all of Latin America, has been to reinforce 
Latin America’s commodity bias in the absence of any attempts at “Schumpeterian” 
dynamic upgrading into higher-technology, higher-value added processes and/or 
products. Put differently, technological improvements have been limited to certain 
basic commodities, such as copper concentrates in Chile or iron in Brazil, but no 
attempts have been undertaken to upgrade to different processes (copper smelting) or 
product (steel). In fact, in the cited example for Chile, technological downgrading 
(from smelting back to concentrates) took place. Instead, where high levels of world 
competitiveness have been achieved within the given production process of 
commodities, horizontal diversification into other low-value added commodities has 
taken place. This provides the explanation for export-driven growth (recovery) since 
the end 1980s/early 1990s, not a ‘Schumpeterian’ shift to manufacturing exports 
(especially if one discounts the much hailed Mexican maquila-case as a form of ‘fake’ 
upgrading to manufacturing with little or no backward linkages). Recent optimistic 
outlooks for exports and overall growth in Latin America confirm this trend: It is 
explained mainly by increased international demand (in particular from China) for 
low-value commodities, combined with favourable commodity price developments. 
 
The Latin American picture provides a stark confirmation of the argument that 
catching-up economies, if exposed to international market pressures without any 
accompanying system of incentives and compulsion to ensure that these market 
pressures are translated into learning and technology rents may end up downgrading 
their technological capabilities. The social costs of this process are also only too well 
known: The other side of the coin of low inflation and supposed macroeconomic 
stabilization across all Latin American countries with fiscal deficits below 2% of GDP 
over the past 20 years (with the exception of Brazil and Argentina for particular 
reasons) has been widespread urban unemployment, increased income inequality and 
high and increasing segmentation of labour markets.  
 
Differently from the Asian experience, the Latin American experience thus highlights 
a situation in which similar institutional approaches to industrial policy lead to 
differing outcomes. Not only were the import-substituting industrialisation policies of 
the pre-1980s differently successful, but the recent reactions to the high social and 
economic costs of the neoliberal shock therapy applied to virtually all Latin American 
economies, also led to different outcomes: While some countries, such as Chile, 
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Colombia, most Central American economies and, to some extent, Mexico, remain 
committed to a neoliberal policy agenda, at least in purely economic terms, the high 
social cost of these policies led to regime changes in Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador 
and, most recently, Paraguay. As with the Asian experience, we argue that these 
differing outcomes are best explained by analysing the compatibility of rent 
management strategies with underlying political settlements and configurations of 
power balances. This also means that the “new”, largely state-led industrial policy 
regimes in Venezuela and Bolivia, amongst other Latin American countries, may fail, 
unless they manage to break through the firm grip that constellations of clientelist 
pactos have had on these economies for the best part of two centuries.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
In this chapter we have examined the compatibility of the institutions of catching up 
with the organization of political power and discussed a number of variants in Asia 
and Latin America that help to explain their very different experiences. Table 3 
summarizes these key features of our argument. 
 
We argued that the coincidence of liberalization with a growth spurt in some Asian 
countries can be better explained by our alternative analysis, which identifies some of 
the limits of the previous industrial policy regimes in these countries. Extending this 
analysis to Latin America we argued that the failure of import substituting 
industrialization across Latin America, and the consequent liberalization policy shock, 
led to a similar process of shifting to technologies that were already profitable given 
technical capacities as well as to wide-spread technological downgrading. 
 
There are many features which differentiate the Far Eastern and Latin American 
experiences.  First, South Korea and other East Asian NICs proceeded from the first 
‘easy’ stage of import-substituting domestic industrialization to an intermediate phase 
of ‘export-substituting industrialization’, replacing their agricultural and resource-
based exports by manufactured consumer products, before moving on to the final and 
heavy stage of industrialization. By contrast, Brazil switched directly from domestic 
light industrialization to domestic heavy industrialization, skipping the ‘export-
substituting’ phase. This was not for want of trying: Subsequent Brazilian 
governments offered a wide range of export subsidies to domestic and transnational 
manufacturing producers, and some success was achieved in the 1970s with the share 
of manufacturing exports in overall exports reaching levels of 30-50% and including 
some more capital intensive industries (automobiles, chemicals, aircraft, electrical 
machinery). But this performance decidedly lags behind that of East Asian NICs and 
even South Asian economies with shares of 70-80% at similar stages of 
industrialization.  
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Corresponding Political 
Configuration
Industrial Policy Institutions
(Rent Management Strategy) Economic Outcome
Powerful and fragmented 
intermediate class factions 
protect inefficient rents
Learning rents regularly 
become redistributive rents
Targeted learning Rents, 
Public sector technology 
acquisition
Many infant industries 
fail to grow up
Moderate growth and 
slow pace of 
transformation
Indian subcontinent 
1960s 1970s
Malaysia 
1980s 1990s
Powerful intermediate classes 
but centrally organized after 
1980
Centralized transfers delink 
redistributive rents from 
learning rents
Public sector and MNC-led 
technology acquisition
Rapid growth and 
capitalist transformation
Latin America 1980s 
onwards
Old Clientelist elite remains 
powerful, but growing political 
fragmentation.
Resurgence of populism
Rapid liberalization, Market-
friendly competition policies
Export Growth but low 
Productivity Growth.
Technological 
downgrading and 
reliance on traditional 
comparative advantage
Targeted Learning Rents Rapid growth and capitalist transformation
South Korea
1960s
Limited political power of 
intermediate class factions to 
protect inefficient capitalists
Indian subcontinent 
1980s 1990s
Liberalization and slow 
withdrawal of subsidies for 
learning.
Powerful and fragmented 
intermediate classes remain
Growing political 
fragmentation
Growth led by niche 
sectors. Higher growth 
than before but limited 
to already existing 
technological capacities
Latin America 1950s 
to 1980s
Targeted learning rents, public 
sector and MNC-led technology 
acquisition
Alternating Political Cycles of 
Populist Regimes and 
Oligarchic Clientelism
Learning rents rapidly become 
redistributive rents
Initial rapid growth 
undermined by foreign 
debt and BOP problems
Many infant industries 
fail to grow up
 
Table 3 Compatibility of Rent Management and Political Configurations 
 
Consequently, Brazil lacked an important comparable source of foreign exchange 
earnings. Second, Brazilian industrialization was not led by large domestic holding 
companies, as was the case of South Korea. Rather, it came to be led by a 
combination of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and TNCs (including joint ventures) 
(e.g. Gereffi and Wyman 1990). Despite fairly stringent requirements imposed by the 
state on joint ventures by TNCs with both SOEs and private capital, the Brazilian 
state could not successfully impose the Malaysian route: It did not have the overall 
political credibility or sufficient effective control of domestic capital to deter TNCs 
from free-riding through alliances with particular factions. Nor was the Brazilian state 
in a position to follow the Taiwanese route of state-led technology acquisition in 
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SOEs combined with an efficient technology transfer to a competitive private sector 
of medium-sized firms, since its relationship with the private sector was certainly 
characterized by a high degree of structural autonomy, but not therefore also the same 
degree of political autonomy that would have allowed it to impose a competitive 
structure on industrials without alternative power bases. Put differently, while the 
Brazilian state employed elements of all successful – South Korean, Taiwanese and 
Malaysian – strategies, it could not carry any of these through to their conclusions. 
Third, the failure, for all these reasons, to mobilize domestic resources to the same 
extent as the East Asian NICs, by raising the saving rate and earning foreign exchange 
through manufacturing exports, entailed a growing reliance on foreign borrowing and 
debt, with a concomitant high vulnerability to the volatility of international, and in 
particular US, financial capital flows and policy-making.  
 
These differences, we have argued above, have their deeper roots in the underlying 
political economy. The three Latin American paths outlined above highlight essential 
obstacles to late industrial development in Latin America. The institutional 
approaches to industrial policy were not fundamentally different that those of East 
Asia. Rather, they consisted of different combinations of successful elements of 
strategies employed in different East Asian countries (South Korea, Malaysia and 
Thailand). As in East Asia, the outcomes were nevertheless different, reflecting 
different degrees of compatibility of the rent management strategies adopted and the 
evolving political configurations in each country. Similar stories to that of Brazil 
unfolded in Argentina, Uruguay and Mexico; Chile and Bolivia are closer to the case 
of Peru, and Venezuela, Colombia, Paraguay and Ecuador constitute hybrid cases. It 
goes without saying that the differences in the exact power configurations and the 
consequences of their precise incompatibility with institutional approaches to 
industrial policy are often huge, especially from an inter-Latin American comparative 
perspective.  
 
Thus, for example, in Argentina populism took a less authoritarian turn than in Brazil, 
mainly because landed elites were less reliant on the supply of cheap agricultural 
labor, and the urban working classes mobilized earlier than in Brazil. Mexico differed 
fundamentally from Brazil (and Argentina) in that the traditional oligarchies were 
overshadowed by an all-inclusive state-structure, emanating from an early revolution 
‘from below’, with clientelist networks evolving within this state structure rather than 
from outside. Similarly, Chile was less dominated by foreign capital than was Peru 
and a much closer link between landholders and urban entrepreneurs had evolved, 
mainly in the form of multiple holdings and closer kinship relations. At the same time, 
radical mobilization was even more virulent than in Peru, not least because of faster 
urbanization.  
 
Finally, Venezuela constitutes a hybrid case between Brazil and Colombia, in that its 
state became much more inclusive than Colombia’s with the consequence that it 
embarked on more challenging state-led industrialization projects than Colombia and 
factionalized with a more destructive impact on the effectiveness of industrial policies 
than in Colombia (DiJohn 2004). This said, there was, in all its different 
manifestations, one main obstacle to East Asian style catching-up development in 
Latin America: The colonial inheritance of strong landed elites and early urbanization. 
Whether these landed elites allied themselves with emerging industrial interests (as in 
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Brazil and Colombia) or not (as in Peru), or whether early urbanization led to the 
emergence of radical mass parties with a potential to undermine indigenous capitalist 
development (as in Peru, and in Colombia until 1949, but not in Brazil), it was 
ultimately the interplay between these two forces that determined the fate of late 
industrialization in Latin America. It is worth noting that the only East Asia economy 
whose performance resembles that of the poorer Latin American countries – the 
Philippines – shares many of the characteristics that have beset Latin American 
industrialization, primarily strong landed elites and very belated land reforms. 
 
The hallmark of Latin American liberalization policy – apart from increased income 
inequality having been a creeping process of technological downgrading, rather than 
“Schumpeterian” dynamic upgrading to higher-value added processes and/or 
products. In fact, in some countries like Chile, technological downgrading (from 
smelting back to concentrates) took place. A higher degree of international 
competitiveness has, instead, been achieved through horizontal diversification into 
other low-value added commodities. The recent optimistic outlook for exports and 
overall growth in Latin America (ECLAC 2004) confirms this trend: It is explained 
mainly by increased international demand (in particular from China) for low-value 
commodities, combined with favorable commodity price developments. 
 
From the perspective developed here, this outcome is not surprising: The removal of 
obstacles to market opportunities does not automatically deliver high(er) productivity 
growth (other than perhaps in Ricardian commodities) or create dynamic capitalist 
economies in late developers. Instead, we have argued, what is needed is a system of 
compulsion that, at least initially, replaces the role played by the market mechanism 
in early developers to compensate for high private risk and to help overcome 
structural socio-political obstacles to capital accumulation. To function in this sense, 
such transitory systems of compulsion must be based on mutually compatible 
technology acquisition strategies and political settlements. Under import-substituting 
industrialization, formidable obstacles to such compatibility in Latin America meant 
that (a) the considerable growth in size of industry did not translate into productivity 
increases to the same extent as it did in some East Asian NICs (e.g. Reynolds 1970 for 
Mexico, Díaz Alejandro 1970 for Argentina) mainly because state-created rents 
deteriorated into redistributive rather than learning rents, and (b) the political alliances 
underwriting state-led industrialization factionalized.  
 
Liberalization did nothing to tackle these obstacles in Latin America’s various 
political settlements, described above. Instead, it reinforced existing structural and 
political obstacles to catching-up industrialization and their main symptoms, namely a 
weak and risk-averse indigenous industrial class and a domination by foreign capital 
that operates in its own rather than Latin America’s interest. Other than in India, 
liberalization has thus not even led to a ‘niche strategy’ based on the exploitation of 
high-productivity assets created under state-led industrialization by local capital, but 
has instead resulted in technological downgrading and decline by sending local 
entrepreneurs scrambling for cover in ‘niches’ of low-risk, low value-added 
horizontal diversification of resource-processing industries and leaving the 
exploitation of high-productivity assets, inherited from import-substituting 
industrialization to foreign interests. In addition, the failure of liberalization in 
addressing the underlying socio-political factors that have impeded Latin America’s 
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industrialization from the start is confirmed rather starkly by the current stand-off 
between resurging transformational projects in Latin America: Chavez’ populist route 
in Venezuela, Alan Garcia’s and Alvaro Uribe’s oligarchic clientelist alternative in 
Peru and Colombia and Evo Morales’ renewed attempt at a ‘revolution from below’ 
in Bolivia. 
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